Distintos sentidos del concepto de violencia

the starting point of this investigation consists of assuming the multiplicity of signification that the concept of violence implies, and conflicts that mean semantic vagueness for social life. the multiplicity of significations is in regard to the great variety of phenomena social life that are understood by concept of violence, here we find individual actions as well as institutions and the state. the problem of vagueness, on the other hand, sends a dangerous confusion between two different planes of the use of discourse for the legitimation of power. these can be marked by the following way: the first sends a set of beliefs that justify the authority of power because its exercise redounds in a material benefit of life conditions of the collective, while the second one is that where set of beliefs is manipulated and controlled by rhetorics that cover forms of domination and alienation of individuals. what is important to analyze here in this paper is the second plane of power justification and the construction of certain knowledge as well as legal forms that cover violence with an appearance of justice and social equity. from the methodological point of view our first work hypothesis will be that concept the concept of violence is not a near tautology, but that thing implies a multiplicity of signification. to explain this we will use the theory of frege's theory of significations, using the difference between sense and reference. two conclusions will deducted, first that the concept of violence are descriptive, because each proposition offers new information, and its is not a simply repetition of the same one, and second, that the nature of concept references being treated are neither properties nor function, not even entities that allude to the objective world, being them historical constructions. to prove the latter statement a second hypothesis will be introduced, which ascertains the nirtzschean character of the metaphor, this is a man's inventions to live in